Because people need to know what they can and cannot legally do, laws cannot be too vague. When a court is faced with the question of whether a law is too vague it will decide whether a "reasonably intelligent person of the community" could interpret its provisions. If they could, the law will stand. If they could not, it will be struck.

The City’s Extended Dance Event bylaw is vague in a number of ways. First, there are a number of specific provisions which themselves are vague. Second, the bylaw is so overly broad in its application that its boundaries are vague.

The term "gathering" is vague. Does it include people congregating in anticipation of the event (and similarly leaving afterwards) or does it only include people already "gathered" within certain premises and actually listening to music? The distinction is important due to the time component of "five hours" in the definition of an EDE.

Also, what does "primary purpose" mean? There are many places where the enjoyment of music is combined with the enjoyment of another activity (for example, a supper club). In many situations a determination of which enjoyment is the "primary purpose" of the event is, arguably, impossible.

The terms "holiday parties", "community dances" and "… or similar events" are vague. For example, is any party during the Christmas season a "holiday party" or must it occur on the actual holiday. Similarly, is a "community dance" one where attendees are from a specific geographical location or could it mean an event where attendees are from a specific ethnic or cultural community?

Because the exemptions are vague it is difficult to know when an EDE does or does not require a licence.

Section 17 states:

Due to the lack of criteria for what is "adequate" "in the opinion" of the Chief Licence Inspector an applicant cannot know what it will need to show to qualify for a licence. This has been considered to be "undue vagueness" in the courts.

1. Section 19

The terms "organizes, promotes, allows, provides entertainment or concessions for" and the term "in any way profits from" are vague. For example, does the coat check girl "profit from" an event because she is paid an hourly wage? Also, what does "allow" mean? Is anyone who knows of an unlicenced EDE and does nothing to stop it potentially liable? One might reasonably think so. Because of the use of such terms, exactly who could or would be held liable in the event of an unlicenced EDE is difficult to determine.

2. Section 20

Any person who is shown to be: (a) the registered owner of a Venue on the Land Title; (b) the payee of business or property tax for the Venue; or (c) the payee of utilities on the utilities statement of the Venue, may be "deemed" to have "allowed" an EDE to take place. These definitions could be met by more than one person for any given Venue. Would they all be liable for the breach? Or, is the City simply trying to get at the "owner" of the Venue by using several different methods of proving who that is? Again, who exactly is going to be held responsible for an unlicenced EDE under the Bylaw is uncertain or "vague".

The definition of a "Responsible Party" found under section 2(9) could include every single person involved in putting on an event (again, even the coat check girl if she is paid). Because of this, who is truly responsible for carrying out the obligations of the licence conditions found in sections 21 through 24, 26 through 28, and section 30 and 31?

The Bylaw’s scope of application is ridiculously broad. In order to properly appreciate that scope one must look at how the provisions work together to create a licensing requirement.

As noted, section 2(4) defines an EDE as "a gathering of people for the primary purpose of listening to or dancing to music for a period lasting more than five (5) hours."

Section 5 requires a licence to be obtained if the "expected attendance" at the EDE is 250 or more people.

Section 6 states that there is a "deemed" (ie: assumed) expected attendance of 250 if:

1. the venue was more than 200 square metres (ie: 2,152.78 square feet – which could include many homes within the City):
2. the venue had an occupancy of 250 or more;
3. 250 or more tickets were printed or sold; or
4. the promotional material implies that the attendance will exceed 250.

Section 2(10) defines a "venue" merely as "any place at which an EDE takes place."

The only exemptions are listed under section 7 as "wedding dances, holiday parties, community dances, school dances, or similar events."

Now, as most in the industry are likely aware, the way the above scheme works an EDE licence is (at least technically) needed under the Bylaw for every pub and club on any given night. What many may not realize, however, is that an EDE licence could be required for a private get-together in a person’s own home. 2,152.8 square feet is not all that extraordinary a size for a house. There are likely a goodly number of them in the City (perhaps the mayor’s?). If the "primary purpose" of the get-together is music and the gathering is more than five hours, a licence is needed. It does not matter how many people are actually there. Based on the square footage of the "venue", section 6 "deems" an "expected attendance" of 250 people.

In fact, technically, an EDE licence is required in almost every conceivable situation where people get together to listen and/or dance to music for more than five hours (no matter how many people are there, no matter where they do it, no matter what type of music is involved and no matter what time of the day or night it is). It is obvious that the City did not intend to regulate such an incredible scope of activity. Rather, its purpose in drafting the Bylaw this way was to give itself the "flexibility" (one of the City’s buzz words) to enforce it whenever and wherever it chooses.

The courts do not allow laws to be drafted in this manner. In legal terms, the Bylaw’s vast scope of application makes its boundaries "unduly vague".

The Bylaw infringes the Charter rights of freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly.

First, the Charter right of freedom of expression includes cultural expression. Evidence clearly shows that raves are a form of cultural expression. Indeed, the preamble of the Bylaw itself admits that EDE’s are outlets for cultural expression.

Second, the freedom of peaceful assembly is the right to gather to do what one could legally do alone. There is no doubt that people are legally allowed to listen or dance to music alone for more than five hours. Therefore, their freedom to do so in a group is protected by the Charter.

The two freedoms described above have been limited or "infringed" by the Bylaw. It has decreased the number and types of raves which are financially feasible to put on and, therefore, at which ravers may assemble to express themselves.

When a Charter right has been infringed the government responsible can save the law in question by showing that it is "justifiable" under section 1 of the Charter. In order to do so, however, it must show that the infringement is "in accordance with law". Further, it must also show that the infringement does not go further than is "reasonable necessary" to achieve the goal. This Bylaw cannot pass either of those tests.

First, vague laws are not "in accordance with law". For the reasons laid out above, this Bylaw is too vague to pass this aspect of the Section 1 test of the Charter.

Second, again for reasons laid out above, this Bylaw is too overly broad in its application for its provisions to be considered "reasonably necessary" to the goal of regulating raves. In judicial terms, "its means are too sweeping to the objective" for the infringement to be justifiable.

Additionally, it is not just the Bylaw’s scope of application that is overly broad. The licencing requirements are vastly overreaching since section 10(2) requires an applicant to disclose far more information than could be considered necessary (ie: the names and addresses of directors and shareholders of corporate applicants – what if the corporation is a public entity?). Similarly, the need to grant seven different government agencies access to the EDE venue is, quite arguably, also unnecessary. Finally, the ability given to enforcement officials under section 19 to charge almost anyone even remotely connected with an unlicenced EDE is similarly unnecessary.

It should be noted that the above two Charter rights discussed are not the only possible Charter infringements (freedom from discrimination does comes to mind). These arguments, however, have been chosen as those requiring the least complicated evidence. Quite simply, they are cheaper and faster to make while being strong enough to do the job.